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I.  ENGLAND AND HER NORTH AMERICAN COLONIES 
Judicial independence has always formed an integral part of the legal 
system of the United States.  Indeed, it is a legacy that we inherited from 
the English common law.  To be sure, the post-Conquest curia regis 
judges served under the effective control of the Norman Kings of 
England, who used them to consolidate royal power throughout the 
realm.  At this early stage in the formation of the English common law, 
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it is therefore impossible to speak of judicial independence.  But with the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Act of Settlement of 1701, a 
dramatic change took place.  English judges now served not at the 
pleasure of the Crown, but during good behavior.  Thus, the English 
acknowledged that, in order to have an independent judiciary, it was 
essential that judges be guaranteed a tenure of office adequate to ensure 
freedom from political and economic pressure.1  A Canadian scholar 
considers this development as “perhaps the single most important 
element of the common law tradition.”2  Judges could thenceforth be 
removed only by joint addresses of the two legislative Houses of 
Parliament, an extremely difficult procedure. 
It should be noted that the Act of Settlement of 1701 did not apply to 
the English colonies in North America.  Colonial judges were regarded 
by most American colonists as subservient agents of the King.  Indeed, 
royal interference in judicial affairs was cited in the Declaration of 
Independence as one in “a long train of abuses and usurpations” that 
impelled the American colonists to separate themselves from England: 
“[The King of England] has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, 
for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their 
salaries.”3  Independence from England, achieved with the aid of France 
after a protracted military conflict, transformed the thirteen English 
colonies into the thirteen original States of the United States. 
II.  JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
Prior to the ratification of the 1787 Federal Constitution, there were no 
Federal courts.  Each State, however, had its own court system.  The 
principle of judicial tenure during good behavior prevailed, effectively 
protecting the State judiciary against State executive (but not legislative) 
branch interference.4  The notion of popular sovereignty, analogous to 
Rousseau’s volonté générale, argued in favor of judicial submission to 
legislation.  This concept, so characteristic of the philosophy underlying 
the French code civile of 1803, was articulated already in 1776 by 
Thomas Jefferson, who felt that the judge, in relation to the legislator, 
should be a “mere machine.”5  As it turned out, State court judges in the 
 
 1. Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c.2, § 3 (Eng.). 
 2. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE 
DIVERSITY IN LAW 224 (2000). 
 3. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776). 
 4. See Joseph H. Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 
124 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1152–56 (1976); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787 160–61 (1969). 
 5. 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 374 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987). 
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United States did not become “mere machines” of the legislator.  
Drawing on the tradition of the common law, State court judges were 
destined to make new law by shaping common law rules to meet the 
needs of a rapidly expanding economy.6  Such judicial activism was 
deplored by some as unwanted judicial legislation, but was applauded by 
others as a necessary corrective to unimaginative formalism and 
legislative abuses.  Unresolved by the passage of time, the debate 
concerning the proper role of judges continues until the present day.7 
III.  JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787 
By overly restraining the power of the central government, the 
Articles of Confederation (1781–1787) proved to be ineffective and 
unworkable.  The 1787 Constitution created a much needed and remarkably 
enlarged Federal governmental structure.  The powers delegated to 
Congress, although intended to be limited, were nevertheless quite 
extensive.8  Article III of the Constitution, the Judicial Article, created 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  It also empowered Congress to establish and 
determine the jurisdiction of lower Federal courts.  The original 
jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court is fixed by Article III (all cases 
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and cases in 
which a State is a party) and may not be enlarged or diminished by 
Congress.9 
But there is textual authority in the Constitution giving Congress the 
power to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Article III provides that the Court shall have appellate jurisdiction “with 
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 
make.”10  Clearly, the most important part of Article III, at least for 
 
 6. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 182–83 (Beacon Press 
1966); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 73–74 
(1960); ELISABETH ZOLLER, LE DROIT DES ETATS-UNIS 80–96 (2001); LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 685 (2d ed. 1985). 
 7. See the multifaceted views presented in Symposium: Judges as Tort 
Lawmakers, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 275–565 (1999). 
 8. Article I, Section 8 contains a list of some of the most important delegated 
legislative powers: the power to tax, to borrow and to spend money, and to regulate 
interstate and foreign commerce.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  Article II, the Executive 
Article, empowers the President, inter alia, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 139–44 (1803). 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  In Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wallace) 506, 
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judicial independence purposes, is the so-called “Tenure and Salary 
Clause”: all federal judges enjoy lifetime tenure with a guarantee that 
their salary “shall not be diminished during their Continuance in 
Office.”11 
In sum, the Tenure and Salary Clause of the U.S. Constitution guarantees 
the personal (or decisional) independence of all federal judges.  The 
Judiciary as an institution, however, is considerably less independent of 
the other co-ordinate branches of the government.  Reference has 
already been made to the power of Congress to establish (or disestablish) 
lower federal courts, and to assign (or withdraw) the jurisdiction of such 
courts.  All this is part of the U.S. system of checks and balances which, 
together with the doctrine of separation of powers, must be considered 
America’s greatest contribution to the notion of constitutionalism (a 
government of limited powers responsible to the people). 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Judicial independence forms an integral part of the doctrine of 
separation of powers.  The person who deserves the most credit for modern 
development of this theory is the 18th century French philosopher 
Montesquieu.  Writing in 1734, Montesquieu outlined the dangers of 
concentrating political power in any one governmental institution: 
   When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in 
the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty . . . .  Again, there is no 
liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and 
executive.  Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject 
would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the 
legislator.  Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with 
violence and oppression.12 
The men who drafted the American Constitution of 1787 were well 
acquainted with Montesquieu’s theory that a tripartite separation of 
powers is essential to civil liberty.13  It is impossible to understand the 
American Constitution, and for that matter the legal system of the United 
States, without appreciating the vital role that the doctrine of separation 
of powers plays in an overall system of checks and balances.  The 
Constitution itself reflects this tripartite division of governmental 
 
514–15 (1869), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a recently enacted 
federal law that withdrew the previously existing statutory right of appeal from a 
pending habeas corpus case. 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 12. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 70 
(Thomas Nugent trans., William Benton 1952). 
 13. Alexander Hamilton, quoting Montesquieu, strongly endorsed an independent 
judiciary.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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powers: Article I (legislative powers); Article II (the executive power); 
Article III (the judiciary).14  The separation of these powers, although 
institutionally distinct, was never intended to be airtight.  An intricate 
series of interdependencies were blended into a systemic whole.  Each 
branch of the government carries out its delegated functions 
constitutionally protected from encroachment by the others, but also for 
some purposes dependent on their cooperation.  Thus, the President 
participates in the legislative process by exercising the veto power and 
Congress can override a veto by voting to pass the vetoed legislation by 
a two-thirds majority.  Further, legislation, once enacted, can be 
interpreted or even declared unconstitutional by the Judiciary.  Such 
restraints by one branch against another reveal the essence of the 
American concept of constitutionalism: a written Constitution intended 
to protect individual liberty by preventing the accumulation of too much 
political power in any one branch of the government. 
The founding fathers of the U.S. Constitution, true children of the 
Enlightenment, knew very well that they were not writing a formula for 
an earthly Utopia.  Accepting the fact that human nature is and will 
remain flawed and susceptible to base passions (lust for power; greed; 
dishonesty; megalomania), they crafted a document that gave the 
government enough power to be effective, while at the same time 
preserving a maximum of political and civil liberty. 
V.  THE SELECTION OF JUDGES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
All federal judges are nominated by the President, confirmed by the 
Senate, and serve for life.15  They may be removed only through 
impeachment, discussed below.  The process of Executive Branch selection 
and Senatorial confirmation is unabashedly political.  The President, 
assisted by advisors on the White House staff and the Attorney 
General’s office, seeks out individuals who are not only well qualified 
 
 14. This scheme sets forth a horizontal diffusion of power between co-ordinate 
branches of the Federal Government.  In addition, the U.S. Constitutional structure also 
divides power between the central government and the several States of the United 
States.  See ZOLLER, supra note 6, at 36–69.  Americans have had over 200 years of 
experience working with federalism.  Will this experience be useful to Europeans when 
the time comes to draft a European Constitution? 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  See also MICHAEL J. 
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL 
ANALYSIS (2000); SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT 
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997). 
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professionally, but also whose social, economic, and political views are 
acceptable to him.  A clash of wills takes place when the ideology of a 
federal judicial nominee is viewed by the Senate as a threat to the 
achievement of its defined political agenda.  This happened in 1987 
when President Ronald Reagan nominated Robert H. Bork for a position 
on the U.S. Supreme Court.  Bork, with extensive experience in the 
federal appellate judiciary, in academia, in private law practice, and in 
public service (as Solicitor General of the United States), possessed a 
brilliant intellect and was in all respects exceptionally well qualified for 
the position.  The Senate, however, voting on partisan political lines, 
refused to confirm him.  As Bork later explained, the campaign against 
him, both within and outside the Senate, was characterized by deliberate 
distortion, lies, and abuse.16 
By rejecting Bork’s nomination for the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Senate expressed its opposition to Bork’s conservative philosophy of 
judicial restraint.  Fearful of losing ground in the struggle for cultural 
influence in the country, left-liberal special interest groups convinced a 
majority of Senators to vote against the Bork nomination.  Had he taken 
his seat on the Court, Bork would surely have upheld state and federal 
legislation restricting privacy and other judicially created rights falling 
outside the original understanding of the Constitution.  The Senate at 
that time was led by politicians desirous of placing on the Supreme 
Court progressive activist judges capable of imaginatively using general 
clauses in the Constitution to advance the civil libertarian agenda of the 
Left. 
From the above discussion it should be clear that the federal judicial 
appointment process is highly political.  The policy beliefs of nominees 
are closely scrutinized by the Executive Branch prior to nomination, and 
subsequently by the Senate during the confirmation proceedings.  Does 
this practice undermine the independence of the Federal Judiciary?17  
Apparently not.  Once a judicial nominee takes office, the confirmation 
“ordeal by fire” is of no legal significance whatsoever.  Assured of a 
decent salary and life tenure, federal judges decide individual cases free 
of any and all influence from Congress or the President. 
As noted above, a distinction may be drawn between personal or 
decisional judicial independence (freedom to decide any given case 
without extraneous interference) and branch independence (the ability to 
carry on activities without substantial and significant support from the 
 
 16. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 267–343 (1990). 
 17. See CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE 
RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 161–73 (1997). 
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other branches of the Federal Government).18  Decisional judicial 
independence remains strong; a much more realistic threat lies in the 
possibility that Congress may attempt to diminish or regulate the powers 
of the Judiciary as a whole.  As a political science professor has pointed 
out, these attempts “can take many forms: nibbling away at court 
jurisdiction by removing cases to administrative tribunals, altering rules 
of court procedure, limiting the number of judgeships or failing to fill 
vacancies that exist, and failing to give full effect to court orders.”19  The 
federal court structure could therefore be described as an arrangement of 
independent judges within a dependent judiciary.  Governmental powers 
are separated yet interdependent, a typical feature of the American 
system of checks and balances. 
VI.  IMPEACHMENT OF FEDERAL JUDGES 
All federal judges hold their offices during good behavior.20  Should a 
federal judge misbehave, he may be impeached by Congress and 
removed from office: “The President, Vice President and all civil 
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.”21 
Treason is narrowly defined in the Constitution as “levying War 
against . . . [the United States], or in adhering to their enemies, giving 
them Aid and Comfort.”22  Bribery has a fairly well settled meaning in 
substantive criminal law.23  The term “high crimes and misdemeanors,” 
however, continues to puzzle scholars.24  Does it mean only some kind 
 
 18. John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial 
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 355 (1999). 
 19. Id. at 361.  The Senate is currently controlled by the Democratic Party.  Since 
his inauguration in January 2001, President George W. Bush, a Republican, has 
nominated ninety persons to the federal bench.  To date, the Senate has voted on less 
than half the nominees.  Alberto Gonzales, writing in the Wall Street Journal, considers 
this to be a violation of the Senate’s Constitutional responsibility.  Alberto Gonzales, The 
Crisis in Our Courts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002, at A18. 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 21. Id. art. II, § 4. 
 22. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
 23. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 526–38 (3rd ed. 
1982). 
 24. EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL & PAUL FINKELMAN, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FROM 1787 TO THE PRESENT 91–185 (1999) (reviewing all 
judicial impeachments and concluding that impeachability may depend on the particular 
facts of the case). 
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of already defined and indictable criminal offense, or was it intended to 
have broader scope to include nonindictable violations of public trust 
and duties?25  Suppose a federal judge were to decide a case, not by 
applying the law, but by arbitrarily applying her own idiosyncratic 
standards of social justice?  Are there limits to judicial independence?  
Is such judicial conduct impeachable?  How far can federal judges 
go, even U.S. Supreme Court Justices, in rendering Constitutional 
interpretations with “no support in law or logic”?26 
Over the course of American history Congress has impeached thirteen 
judges.  Seven were convicted and removed from office, four were 
acquitted, and two resigned before Senate trial.27  Articles of Impeachment 
(essentially a legislative indictment of alleged impeachable offenses) are 
voted on in the House of Representatives, then sent for a guilt-or-
innocence trial before the bar of the Senate.  A vote in the Senate of two-
thirds or more on any article results in the judge’s conviction and 
automatic removal from office.28  This impeachment procedure is the 
exclusive means provided by the Constitution for removal of judges.29  It 
was deemed by the drafters of the U.S. Constitution to be a necessary 
and sufficient means to remedy judicial misbehavior.  At that time, the 
Federal Judiciary was regarded as “the least dangerous” branch of the 
Government.30  But times change.  Modern federal courts actively make 
policy by overturning legislative choices and assuming administrative 
functions that arguably fall within the province of the States or of 
the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.31  The threat of 
impeachment may serve as a meaningful deterrent to dishonest judges 
tempted by bribery, but it is clearly inadequate to rein in an activist 
 
 25. Alexander Hamilton was convinced that abuse or violation of some public trust 
is an impeachable offense.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton); RAOUL 
BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 59 (1974) (finding that it has 
been the practice of the Senate that “impeachment lies for nonindictable offenses”). 
 26. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640 (1996) (Scalia J., dissenting); see also 
Steven W. Fitschen, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Covenantal and Constitutional 
Response to Judicial Tyranny, 10 REGENT U. L. REV. 111, 148–53 (1998) (asserting that 
the six U.S. Supreme Court Justices who comprised the majority in Romer v. Evans are 
guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors because they rendered an unconstitutional 
opinion, subverted fundamental law, and introduced arbitrary power).  Is it possible for 
the U.S. Supreme Court to render an unconstitutional decision in interpreting a clause in 
the U.S. Constitution? 
 27. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 23–35 (2d ed. 2000). 
 28. Id. at 35.   
 29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 108–09 (Alexander Hamilton) (Tudor Publishing 
Co. 1942). 
 30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 99 (Alexander Hamilton) (Tudor Publishing Co. 
1942). 
 31. Edwin Meese III & Rhett DeHart, Reining in the Federal Judiciary, 80 
JUDICATURE 178, 178–83 (1997). 
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Judiciary intent on using the law as an instrument to realize its personal 
notions of liberty, equality, and social justice.32 
VII.  THE INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF STATE                    
COURT JUDGES 
Most studies dealing with judicial independence and accountability 
fail to treat the judiciary of the several state courts.33  This is 
understandable because federal law has national significance while state 
law is normally enforceable only within the territorial boundaries of the 
State.  In addition, there are fifty states, and each state has its own rules 
pertaining to the selection, retention, and removal of its judges.34  But 
despite the difficulties in addressing the issue, it should be noted that 
most of the litigation in the United States is handled in the state courts 
and not in the federal courts.35  It should therefore be obvious that the 
several state court judiciaries form an important part of the American 
scheme of federalism and should be examined, however briefly, in order 
to gain a more complete picture of the nature of the tension between 
judicial independence and judicial accountability. 
There is no uniform scheme for selecting state court judges.  Broadly 
speaking, three methods of selection may be identified: (1) elective, (2) 
appointive, and (3) the so-called “merit” system.36  This last named 
scheme is used by thirty-four states where at least some judges are 
initially appointed by the Governor (the Chief Executive of the State) 
from a list of candidates nominated by a nonpartisan unelected 
commission.37  Four states employ executive appointment without the aid of 
 
 32. Judicial activism in the United States is not new.  It was discussed by Edouard 
Lambert in EDOUARD LAMBERT, LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES ET LA LUTTE CONTRE LA 
LEGISLATION SOCIALE AUX ETATS-UNIS (Paris: M. Giard & Cie. 1921). 
 33. Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 315, 331 (1999). 
 34. See THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, JR. ET AL., STATE JUDICIARIES AND IMPARTIALITY: 
JUDGING THE JUDGES 16–19 (Roger Clegg & James D. Miller eds., 1996); Larry C. 
Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States, 64 JUDICATURE 176 (1980). 
 35. It has been estimated that, in the year 1999, 91.5 million cases were filed in 
state courts compared to less than 2.4 million in federal courts.  See NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS 1999–2000 13 (Brian J. 
Ostrom et al. eds., 2001). 
 36. Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1994).  See also The Fund for Modern Courts, Methods of Judicial 
Selection, at http://www.moderncourts.org/js-methods.htm (last visited July 22, 2004) 
(discussing the first two methods). 
 37. A merit selection sounds good, but is it really an improvement over alternative 
DARBY.DOC 8/22/2019  9:28 AM 
 
1006 
a nominating commission, subject to confirmation by the legislature.  In 
two other states, judges are elected by the State legislature.  Twenty 
states hold partisan elections for some or all of their state court seats.  In 
only three states (Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire) do 
high court judges, after Executive appointment, enjoy life tenure.  Many 
states, like California, use both methods of selection (appointive and 
elective).  In California, high court and intermediate appellate court 
judges are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Commission 
on Judicial Appointments.  A vacancy at trial court level may be filled 
either by a popular election or by Executive appointment.  All appointed 
judges must prevail at the next regularly scheduled general election in 
order to be retained in office.38 
As a rule, California judges are routinely confirmed by the electorate 
at such regularly scheduled retention elections.  Occasionally, however, 
judges are voted out of office by an aroused public.  This happened in 
1986 when the electorate rejected three California Supreme Court 
justices in a highly publicized retention election.39  The most influential 
factor in this electoral campaign was the unpopularity of Chief Justice 
Bird.40  She had done everything in her power to prevent the application 
of the death penalty, a penal measure held in high regard by most 
California voters.41  The event dramatically illustrates the irreconcilable 
differences between majoritarian democracy (judicial accountability) 
and countermajoritarian aristocracy (judicial independence). 
Campaigning in judicial retention elections in states like California 
 
selection methods?  See E.M. Gunderson, “Merit Selection”: The Report and Appraisal 
of a Participant Observer, 10 PAC. L.J. 683 (1979), for a negative answer. 
 38. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16.  California Supreme Court and intermediate 
appellate court judges serve for terms of twelve years; trial court judges serve for terms 
of six years.  The pros and cons of electing judges are discussed by Dorothy W. Nelson, 
Variations on a Theme—Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 4, 28–30 
(1962). 
 39. The event attracted nationwide attention.  See John T. Wold & John H. Culver, 
The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of 
Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial 
Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention 
Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007 (1988). 
 40. For two contrasting views of the judicial performance of the California 
Supreme Court and of Chief Justice Bird see PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, “THE COURT ON 
TRIAL”: THE CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL ELECTION OF 1986 (1985) (critical) and BARBARA 
BABCOCK ET AL., THE COURT ON TRIAL: AN ANALYSIS OF PHILLIP JOHNSON’S ATTACK ON 
THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT (1986) (supportive). 
 41. As of two weeks before the election, Chief Justice Bird had voted to reverse 
the death sentence in all fifty-nine of the capital cases that came before her.  See Stephen 
R. Barnett, California Justice, 78 CAL. L. REV. 247, 254 (1990) (reviewing JOSEPH R. 
GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 
(1989)); John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, 
and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 473–74 (1999). 
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costs money.42  The voters most interested in the outcome of such 
elections, and the ones most likely to make financial contributions to the 
judicial candidates are the attorneys who periodically make court 
appearances before the campaigning judge on behalf of their clients.43  
Reforming the system to prohibit lawyers from contributing (or even 
from contributing more than a certain amount) to judicial election 
campaigns may violate freedoms of association and expression protected 
by the First Amendment.44  But efforts are nonetheless being made.  In 
1995, Alabama enacted a law that disqualifies judges who accept 
specified ($2,000 at trial court level; $4,000 at appellate level) large 
campaign contributions from parties or lawyers who later appear before 
the judge.45 
There is no question that state court judges consider the requirement 
of periodic popular elections (and the concomitant need to raise money 
to finance them) not only as a danger to the continuation of a judicial 
career, but also as an indefinable external influence on unfettered 
judicial decisionmaking and thereby on the principle of judicial 
independence. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Judicial independence in the United States forms an integral part of 
the political doctrine of separation of powers.  Judges must be able to 
decide cases free from undue outside influence, especially from the other 
branches of the government, but also from the press, from public 
 
 42. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1133, 1151 (1997) (“Ohio experienced one of the costliest judicial elections in American 
history in 1986, when [the] incumbent Chief Justice . . . spent $1.7 million to keep his 
seat, only to lose to [the challenger], who spent $1 million.”). 
 43. Sometimes campaign contributions are made by opposing parties to a judge 
presiding over pending litigation.  See Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism About Electoralism: 
Rethinking Judicial Campaign Finance, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 505, 516–17 (1999). 
 44. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  See also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution and Expenditure Limits 
in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133, 139–49 (1998) (arguing that 
expenditure limits on judicial elections are constitutional because “there is a compelling 
interest in preserving the integrity and appearance of integrity of the bench and no other 
alternative is likely to succeed”). 
 45. ALA. CODE § 12-24-2 (1995).  This provision is discussed by Boutrous, supra 
note 34, at 71–86.  The Alabama statute also requires a judge to recuse herself from 
hearing a case “in which there may be an appearance of impropriety” because of judicial 
campaign contributions from parties or lawyers.  ALA. CODE § 12-24-1. 
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opinion, from attorneys and their clients, and from whomever also might 
be interested in disrupting the proper conduct of judicial affairs.  Yet the 
right of the judiciary to act independently does not give judges the 
license to act irresponsibly.  In order to prevent arbitrary and capricious 
judicial behavior, limits must be set on the independence of the 
judiciary.  These limits can either form part of the judicial process: lower 
courts are responsible to higher courts; or, in cases of serious judicial 
misconduct, they may be imposed by a co-ordinate branch of the 
government: impeachment and removal by the Legislature, and ordinary 
criminal prosecution by the Executive.  In this way, and consistent with 
the American scheme of checks and balances, governmental power is 
dispersed and the liberties of the people are preserved from the 
despotism that inevitably flows from an accumulation of too much 
power in the hands of an unscrupulous few. 
In a larger sense, judicial independence in any country must begin 
with a genuine commitment to democracy and the rule of law.  In 
countries plagued by war and political instability, judicial independence 
will remain programmatic, irrelevant, and unattainable.46  Even in countries 
more closely associated with the traditions of Western Civilization, the 
experience of the past and the legal culture developed over time will 
invariably condition the way in which judicial independence is conceived 
and practiced.47 
In which branch of the government do people place their greatest 
 
 46. On November 7, 1985, a group of rebels seized the Palace of Justice in Bogota 
and assassinated twelve of the justices of the Supreme Court of Colombia.  William R. 
Long, 12 Colombian Justices Dead, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1985, at A1.  Argentina, 
renowned for once (1976–1983) making its troublesome citizens “disappear” (los 
desaparecidos) is currently suffering from the disappearance of an independent 
judiciary.  Brink Lindsey, How Argentina Got Into This Mess, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2003, 
at A14, states: “The Supreme Court, the supposed bulwark of the rule of law, [has been] 
reduced to a puppet of executive power.”  In 1995, the President of Mexico persuaded all 
twenty-six justices of the Mexican Supreme Court to retire early in order to replace them 
with persons sympathetic to his national reform policies.  See Jorge A. Vargas, The 
Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico: An Appraisal of President Zedillo’s Judicial 
Reform of 1995, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 295, 297 (1996). 
 47. The Minister of Justice of Italy, allegedly for political reasons, recently 
attempted to have a judge hearing a bribery-of-the-judiciary case against the Italian 
Prime Minister transferred to another job in the Milan courts.  Italy, Its Prime Minister 
and the Law: He’s Not Safe Yet, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2002, at 42–43.  In France, a 
judge investigating corruption involving high ranking government officials (right up to 
the President himself) resigned because of alleged “politically motivated sabotage.”  
France, Corruption and the Law: The Bitterness of a Judge, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 
2002, at 43.  Germany, having bridged successful transition from dictatorship (JUSTIZ IM 
DRITTEN REICH 173–74 (Ilse Staff ed., Fischer Bücherei 1964)) to democracy (§ 97 GG), 
nonetheless has also experienced problems where politically sensitive issues are 
involved.  See von Prof. Dr. Ingo Mittenzwei, Richterliche Unabhängigkeit und ihre 
Grenzen, in ZIVILPROZESS UND PRAXIS 375 (1997). 
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trust?  Starting at least with Marbury v. Madison (1803), we in the 
United States have been willing to permit the Judiciary to tell us, in the 
last analysis, “what the law is.”48  France, having suffered greatly from 
the excesses of judicial intervention during the ancien regime, placed its 
trust in the legislature, prohibiting its judiciary from deciding cases by 
laying down general principles for the future.49  France’s traditional fear 
of a “Government of Judges” subsided somewhat with the adoption of 
the 1958 Constitution, Articles 56–63 of which create the Conseil 
constitutionnel and invest it with the power to review proposed 
legislation (after passage but before promulgation) for compatibility with 
the Constitution.50 
In time, the people of France, as well as of other European countries, 
will come to accept an enhanced role of the judiciary as a key 
institutional element in the maintenance of a stable and balanced 
governmental structure.51  We in the United States take pride in having 
over 200 years of experience in encouraging judges to be both 
independent and accountable.  Our history has shown that no branch of 
government has a monopoly on wisdom.  Mistakes have been made, and 
surely will continue to be made, by all three coordinate branches of 
government.52  This is inevitable in public affairs, the consequence of the 
 
 48. To quote from what may be the most famous case in the world: “It is, 
emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is.”  
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
 49. Article 5 of the French Civil Code states: “Judges are forbidden to pronounce 
decisions by way of general and regulative disposition on causes which are submitted to 
them.”  The French Civil Code 2 (John H. Crabb trans., 1995); see also KONRAD 
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 125–26 (3rd ed. 1998) 
(discussing the structure of French judicial positions). 
 50. JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 227–42 (1992), evaluates this 
experiment with judicial review as a success. 
 51. Of great assistance in this regard has been the success of both the European 
Court of Justice in Luxembourg and the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Court in 
Strasbourg. 
 52. Examples of three of the most egregious mistakes are: (1) by the Legislature: 
The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, in particular, An Act for the Punishment of Certain 
Crimes Against the United States, 1 Stat. 596–97 (1798), which threatened criminal 
punishment to anyone defaming the U.S. Government, Congress, or the President.  It was 
aggressively used to silence critics of the Administration of John Adams; (2) by the 
Executive: On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, fearing invasion, 
sabotage, and espionage, issued Executive Order No. 9066, leading to the internment of, 
inter alia, U.S. citizens of Japanese descent; and (3) by the Judiciary: Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).  In Dred Scott, by finding that black slaves 
were not U.S. citizens, possessed no rights under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, and could not sue in courts, the U.S. Supreme Court mistakenly believed 
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fallibility of human nature. 
The Founders of the American Republic took all this into consideration 
when they set the doctrine of separation of powers firmly in place as the 
keystone in the institutional architecture of the U.S. Constitution.  In the 
American legal culture, separation of powers means at the same time 
independence as well as interdependence.  Therein lies the genius of the 

























that it had settled the question of the legality of slavery once and for all. 
